|
Defining a
better Mediterranean union
Next July 13, in Paris,
Europe will better define the Union for the Mediterranean (UM), its latest
venture in the Middle East. Initially proposed by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, the idea has undergone radical transformation, so that the current
incarnation bears little resemblance to the initial proposal. The shape of the
UM will only be clear once the July summit is over, but as things now stand,
the union holds many challenges, but also some promise, for the Middle East.
The original idea, floated
during Sarkozy's presidential campaign, was highly nebulous. Seen as a means of
rebuilding France's role in the Middle East, the plan was also a way for
Sarkozy to appeal to voters of North African origin. Initially, it involved the
10 Mediterranean states and only the southern states of the European Union.
However, Germany, fearing the creation of a power block within the EU,
vociferously objected. Chancellor Angela Merkel slammed the plan as "very
dangerous," arguing it would release "explosive forces in the EU that
I would not like to see."
As a result of German
lobbying, the UM idea has since been watered down. Whereas initially the union
was to be independent of existing EU instruments, such as the Barcelona Process
and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), it has now been reconfigured, as
Hans-Gert Pottering, the president of the European Parliament, has described
it, to "strengthen and further the Barcelona Process." The UM is now
attached to the EU and involves all 27 member states. Additional EU funds will
not be forthcoming, although it is rumored that Qatar and private donors will
be contributing money. The UM, however, does still maintain its
project-specific nature, with an opt-out clause for those states who do not
wish to take part in the projects being offered, which currently center on
energy, pollution, and civil security cooperation issues.
But even the new, expanded
project is drawing a fair amount of flak. As one commentator noted, the
involvement of the 27 EU states may lead to a danger of "too many
meetings, with too many participants that achieve too little." Such
concerns compound fears of duplication and an expansion of an already overly
bureaucratic European system, unless extreme care is taken in overseeing the
linkage with the ENP.
Pessimists point to other
potential stumbling blocks - primarily the acrimonious relations between the
Middle Eastern partners in the UM. Chief among these worries is the simmering
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but hostile Syrian-Lebanese relations and Moroccan-Algerian
tensions are also predicted to place limits on what the UM can realistically
achieve. Supporters, however, liken this to the EU model, whereby shared
interests might generate conflict resolution, with French Minister for European
Affairs Henri Guaino arguing that "it's through concrete cooperation ...
that we can create solidarity between nations."
As observers have noted,
most of the areas marked for projects have been those where collaboration has
taken place under the Barcelona Process. Closer regional relations, therefore,
will have to result not from a novel approach, but from revived association - a
question of degree, not content.
Yet if Guaino's argument
is correct, then the UM might do more than enable Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.
Collaboration on various projects may also provide a helpful platform in aiding
rapprochement in North Africa, vital in light of rising violence by Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb.
Another point of criticism
is the lack of clarity regarding the relationship of the UM with the EU's
political basket - namely the need to enhance democracy and rule of law in the
Middle East. So far, the UM appears focused on business-oriented initiatives,
leading human rights activists to fear the sidelining of democracy and rule of
law requirements within the framework of the EU's relationship with the
Mediterranean states.
Yet the silence over
governance issues can cut both ways. For the Arab counterparts, it's a welcome
relief. Combined with the shared presidency of the UM (one European country
will hold the post together with a Mediterranean country), this could go some
way toward addressing regional resentment of the Barcelona Process and the ENP
- viewed by many as unfairly weighed in favor of the EU. Redressing this
imbalance will enable a sense of appropriation by the Mediterranean
counterparts, providing for more enthusiastic European-Middle East relations.
This will no doubt be
propelled forward by the economic regeneration and job creation aims of the UM.
Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci summarized the Middle Eastern reaction
when he said "if the aim of this project is to create development projects
in the Mediterranean region then it is obvious that we should support it."
Yet laudable though these aims are, the focus on economic reform must be
coupled with pressure for political reform within the ENP framework. Unless the
two are twinned, economic advantages may continue to primarily benefit groups
close to the political elite, as opposed to Middle Eastern populations at
large.
Aside from these concerns,
major questions remain. How will Syria, whose association agreement with the EU
has been frozen as a result of its suspected role in the February 2005
assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, fit into
this framework? What shape can EU-Libyan relations take? The signs are
encouraging for future EU-Middle Eastern relations, but to fulfill the promise
of the UM, European policymakers must also be aware of the potential problems.
Dana Moss is a senior
fellow at the Transatlantic Institute in Brussels. She wrote this commentary
for THE DAILY STAR.
|